When do elections stop mattering?

When do elections stop mattering? The short answer would be: Never. Otherwise, authoritarians and autocrats [1] would stop holding them. Even some of the most nakedly dictatorial leaders still hold elections: Just a few weeks ago, North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Un’s Worker’s Party of Korea claimed a vote share of “99.93%”, at a turnout of “99.99%”.[2] One can only assume that values of 100% may have suggested irregularities. Such cases of outright fraud, “rigged” elections in the most traditional sense of the term, do still occur across the globe. Yet, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, many authoritarian governments today refrain from crude methods such as ballot stuffing and explicit voter intimidation. Even as liberal democracy has been in retreat over the last decades, few states have done away with relatively free elections altogether. Much more common are attempts by incumbent governments to tilt the playing field, entrenching their power across state institutions and the media while changing the rules around elections to give themselves advantages over their opposition. This is what some scholars call “competitive authoritarianism”, an institutional arrangement which combines real democratic institutions with authoritarian structures aiming to maximize the governing party’s power, without consolidating into full-on dictatorship.[3]

Yet, some of these elections matter a lot more than others. Few expected significant upsets from the 2025 Singaporean parliamentary elections, while the upcoming Hungarian elections on April 12th may prove some of the most consequential ones of the decade. Singapore’s ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) has never fallen short of a parliamentary supermajority within the last 45 years, with little reason to believe that this will change in the foreseeable future.[4] By contrast, the Hungarian elections may bring genuine political change, with the opposition party Tisza under Peter Magyar currently outpolling incumbent president Victor Orban’s Fidesz.[5]

Why are elections in Singapore so uncompetitive, even without outright election fraud? Could Hungary be heading the same way? Let us get to the core of this.

In 1955, more than a decade before attaining full independence from the United Kingdom, Singapore held its first legislative elections. The People’s Action Party, at the time a leftist pro-independence party headed by young men trained at British elite universities, was one of many competing parties, and entered into opposition after coming in third.[6] In sharp contrast to later decades, Singapore’s early elections were fiercely competitive, and saw intensive political polarization. During this period, Singapore was marked by both strong ethnic divisions among its large immigrant population, in addition to turbulent anti-colonial, Communist and labor union unrest. However, following the geopolitically turbulences of the 1960s and strategic miscalculations by opposition groups boycotting the first post-independence elections, the PAP was able to secure staggering parliamentary majorities facilitated by the British-style first-past-the-post election system. This culminated in the PAP securing all seats in 1968, endowing them and their leader Lee Kuan Yew with the necessary majorities to legally transform the politics and institutions of the fledgling state to their liking.[7]

And transform Singapore they did. The PAP’s ascent to power during the turbulent 50s and 60s led to a governing philosophy prioritizing economic growth, social unity and security above all else.[8] Seeing the divisions of Singapore’s early years as a major threat, the PAP worked to depoliticize social divisions as much as possible. This has led to major policies aiming to eradicate divisive elements such as racism from politics, ranging from the early promotion of English (rather than the historical majority language of Mandarin Chinese), to the introduction of what are essentially minority quotas for certain districts.[9] However, these policies should not be conflated with liberal democratic ideals of inclusive participation: The PAP has worked extensively to marginalize civil society, following the dogma that “politics is only for political parties”[10], excluding organizations such as labor unions, minority advocacy groups and religious organizations from political decision-making. This is part of the PAP’s broader culture of systemic elitism in which politics are first and foremost understood as an administrative affair to be managed by certified and credentialed experts, rather than a representation of the will of the people. Singapore may have elections, but its government does not care particularly about liberal norms of representation and participation.[11]

Therefore, while the vote counting process itself remains sound, the PAP’s goal to secure long-term dominance has resulted in an active effort to shift the context around elections in their favor: Among other things, they have redrawn districts to their advantage, monopolized control over domestic media, and narrowly redefined the rules of who can and cannot be elected. All the while, the infamous “Internal Security Act”, a holdover from the British colonial administration that allows for the unlimited detention of suspected (vaguely defined) Communists, remains in force and could be applied to potentially bothersome opposition figures at any time.[12]

From a Western European perspective, this arrangement can seem somewhat puzzling: Why would Singaporeans support, or at the very least tolerate, a government that appears more interested in managing rather than representing them? For one, the PAP did not have to substantially revoke civil liberties: Its most invasive laws, such as the Internal Security Act, were introduced under British rule and merely not repealed. This colonial background also meant that most of the Singaporean population had little expectation of a representative and participative government. Most importantly, however, the PAP has been able to deliver consistent economic improvement, leading to the lives of a majority of citizens improving materially throughout PAP rule.[13] A critical mass of Singaporeans therefore seem willing to accept limited participation in politics in exchange for stability and economic growth, although it should be noted that opposition parties have consistently received more than 30% of the vote for the last few decades. Nonetheless, it seems like the PAP has been able to secure a comfortable degree of what scholars call output legitimacy – the ability of a system to secure popular support by delivering high-quality, problem-solving policy.[14]

Could Hungary’s Fidesz be headed the same way as the PAP, entrenching itself in power for decades to come? There certainly are some major parallels. For instance, the strategic purchasing of key private media companies by Orbán allies and the politicization of public broadcasters eventually led to a de-facto Fidesz monopoly on national media without necessitating explicitly coercive government action.[15] This arrangement resembles the PAP’s control over the issuing of shares of Singapore’s sole newspaper company, leading to a similar de facto-PAP monopoly on national media without requiring direct censorship.[16] Both parties have appointed loyalists to positions across the entire state apparatus, and have made use of aggressive redistricting to secure their majorities.[17]

Nonetheless, Hungary’s historical context is quite different from that of Singapore. While they share a history of imperial control under other countries, with Hungary having been under Soviet influence for most of the 20th century, post-independence Hungary did not continue the USSR’s systems of control and repression. Rather, both its economic and political structures liberalized significantly, with commentators viewing Hungary as a solidly consolidated democracy as it entered the early 2000s.[18] Indeed, Orbán’s first term was relatively conventional, with Fidesz governing as a center-right party before ultimately failing to secure re-election in 2002. Unlike Lee Kuan Yew however, Orbán did not see ethnic divisions as a potential vulnerability of his country, but instead as a fertile source of political support. From his 2010 re-election campaign onward, Orbán exploited nationalist resentment of domestic minorities, such as Hungary’s Romani and Jewish populations, alongside foreigners associated with international actors such as the European Union.[19]

Hungarian political economist Gábor Scheiring argues that Orbán’s combination of exclusionary nationalism and institutional authoritarianism forms a necessary part of his political strategy: The core of Orbán’s supporters lies in both disaffected rural workers that felt left behind by post-Soviet economic transformation, and domestic entrepreneurs that felt excluded from the gains of early 2000s international investment.[20] According to Scheiring, these groups have contradictory interests: Hungarian entrepreneurs desire cheaper labor costs, while workers need higher wages to improve their standard of living. However, Orbán’s reliance on the support of domestic entrepreneurs prevents him from enacting policies that would meaningfully address these tensions. Thus, being unable to resolve this conflict without losing core pillars of his support, the only way that Orbán and Fidesz have been able to maintain their grip on power has been by mobilizing both bases with polarizing ethnonationalism, and tilting the electoral playing field in Fidesz’ favor.[21, 22]

In Scheiring’s telling, this is where Hungary’s story ends: A downward spiral of social tensions and increasing populist authoritarianism. One may thus expect Fidesz to become dominant like the PAP: A multigenerational, hegemonic structure that has successfully embedded itself into its state at the most fundamental level.

However, there are some crucial differences between the PAP and Fidesz that may yet imperil the latter’s claim to power. First, where the PAP was able to build a sustainable base across Singapore’s ethnic divisions, Fidesz instead relies on further polarizing the Hungarian population. While this has undeniably proven effective in securing simple majorities in the past, it both inherently leaves a large part of the electorate on the table, and may build significant resentment among those on the other side of the fence. This may be enough to win individual elections, but not to consolidate the supermajorities necessary for PAP-style intergenerational dominance. Given the intense domestic political tensions and highly energized opposition ahead of the upcoming Hungarian elections,[23] this strategy of polarization may finally show its limits.

Perhaps more importantly, unlike the PAP, Fidesz rule has not been marked by spectacular economic growth, particularly in recent years. Where the PAP has been able to build output legitimacy by providing better lives for large parts of Singaporean society, Fidesz’ popular support relies primarily on nationalist populism. This may yet prove insufficient to build multigenerational coalitions in light of the economic stagnation that Hungary continues to experience under Fidesz rule. Indeed, political scientists Steven Lewitsky and Lucan Way find that one factor preventing aspiring autocrats across the world from doing away with structures such as unforged elections is their inability to deliver the benefits of a well-functioning state, among them consistent economic growth.[24] While Hungary is far from being a weak state that is fully unable to provide these benefits, Orbán has proven incapable of delivering the sort of economic growth that would provide the necessary output legitimacy to firmly secure his party’s power in the long run – likely in part due to his political reliance on placating Hungary’s domestic economic elite.

Orbán may thus survive another election – after all, he has done virtually everything in his power to tip the playing field in his favor – but Hungarian elections as such may continue to matter in spite of this. Fidesz has not positioned itself well for intergenerational electoral dominance, owing to both its focus on polarization as a political strategy, and its structural inability to deliver the economic growth necessary for generating overwhelming output legitimacy. The PAP, on the other hand, was able to structurally establish a supporter base that spanned across traditional dividing lines within Singaporean society, while also providing long-term economic growth that firmly secured a base willing to tolerate encroaching authoritarianism.

When do elections stop mattering? Not for as long as they are held. When are they likely to lose relevance, with one party establishing nearly uncontestable dominance? Only at the point where this party has been able to secure decades-long political hegemony that requires both support that cuts across social divides and successful economic policy. While Singapore’s PAP may have been able to establish this constellation, this need not mean that other systems will follow. Independently of the upcoming election’s outcome, authoritarianism in Hungary may thus be less consolidated than it appears.

Author: Elias Gerndt-Eisenhower