On the 2nd of March 2026, the French president, Emmanuel Macron, gave a speech on France’s nuclear deterrence. He was in the strategic naval base of l’île Longue, which houses one of France’s nuclear deterrence components, the Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN). The visual message of the speech was strong, as Macron stood in front of Le Téméraire, one of four SSBNs, his words echoing in the cathedral-like hall. With the highest members of the government and the commanding bodies of the army gathered around him, an a cappella Marseillaise resonated, showcasing strong symbolism. In the forty-five-minute-long speech, Macron established that the rules-based world order was on the verge of tipping, reasserting the need for a strong, independent, and credible nuclear deterrence force. To do so, he talked about the path of “forward deterrence” that should be developed “within the depth of the European continents”.[1] Macron went as far as naming eight European partners with which France will increase cooperation, an unprecedented feat in the country’s nuclear doctrine. Yet, as Macron himself acknowledged, this European dimension is not new.[2] So the real question is not what France is offering today, but why, for sixty-five years, that offer has never quite materialised. Let’s get to the core of this.

A nuclear deterrence force is often referred to as a nation’s long-term life insurance.[3] The force is meant to deter an enemy from attacking that nation, whatever the size or flag. In the case of France, nuclear weapons would be used to inflict irreparable damage to an enemy threatening the country’s vital interests. This defensive doctrine relies on three key elements: operational, technological, and political credibility.[4] For deterrence to exist, potential enemies need to believe that France has both the ability to strike and the determination to resort to it, outweighing any gains derived from attacking. To do so, France has developed a dyad deterrence force, composed of four SSBNs each carrying sixteen nuclear ballistic missiles, and around forty nuclear-capable Rafale aircraft.[5] The SSBNs are used to inflict massive damage, while the Rafale fulfils a role unique to French deterrence: nuclear warning. This concept is meant to inflict a limited nuclear strike on the enemy, indicating that the conflict will enter a new dimension, a nuclear one, if combat does not cease.[6] This prevents a resort to an ‘all or nothing’ doctrine.

Having led the field of nuclear science in the early 20th century, France re-engaged with this field right after the war, in 1945, when the Commission for Atomic Energy (CEA) was created. While aimed at applying nuclear energy for civilian infrastructures, the CEA collaborated with various branches of the military throughout the 1950s, ultimately playing a central role in creating the weapon.[7] On the 13th of February, 1960, the first nuclear test was conducted in Reggane, Algeria. The first operational weapon was delivered on the 1st of July 1963, and the first Mirage IV bomber was put on alert in September 1964. The first SSBN was commissioned in December 1971, and a submarine has been continuously deployed ever since.

The need for an independent national deterrence force, driven in part by de Gaulle, was born out of a fear of the past and doubts about the trustworthiness of the postwar Atlantic alliance. The scars left by the German occupation helped justify the development of nuclear weapons, as possessing them meant that 1940 would never happen again.[8] The distrust felt towards the Atlantic alliance was mostly felt in regard to the Soviet threat. De Gaulle believed that a country was responsible for its national interests, and that Europe should not rely on the Americans for its defence.[9] The lack of American support in Diên Biên Phu in 1954 and during the 1956 Suez crisis fed into this scepticism, to the point where nuclear weapons were seen as the only way for France to have an independent foreign policy. The weapons were also seen as a way to increase France’s influence among the international community, particularly the Atlantic community and the UN.[10]

While very much presented as a national doctrine, the French nuclear deterrence always possessed a European dimension. For de Gaulle, the fate of France and Europe was closely linked, so much so that in 1964, he declared that France should “feel threatened as soon as the territories of federal Germany and Benelux are violated”.[11] Furthermore, de Gaulle often mentioned the concept of ‘trigger’ as an indirect contribution of the French deterrence to the safety of Europe. A French arsenal beyond American control meant the US could never stand aside, as the risk of uncontrolled escalation would force Washington to defend Europe before France acted alone.[12] While the ‘trigger’ ceased to be relevant when the US recognised the French nuclear arsenal in 1974, de Gaulle’s comments echo the idea that the mere presence of nuclear weapons on the European continent already acts as a deterrent. Even in the time of its most sovereign-focused nature, French deterrence was always considered to contribute to European security.

This European and allied dimension ceased to be championed by de Gaulle as soon as he believed France’s sovereignty over its nuclear weapons was threatened. When the US and UK formalised their exclusive nuclear partnership in 1958, shutting France out, de Gaulle responded with a demand for a tripartite directorate, which was refused. Eight years later, in 1966, as Washington pushed to centralise control over NATO’s nuclear strategy, de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated command entirely.[13] Every time, the moment European solidarity threatened French sovereignty over the weapon, sovereignty won. That tension, between the European rationale and the national architecture, has never been resolved, running from 1958 all the way to l’île Longue in 2026.

In January 1992, soon after Germany was reunified and Europe’s architecture was to be redesigned, President Mitterrand alluded to a European defence identity, raising the question of building a European nuclear doctrine.[14] A few weeks later, Jacques Mellick, Secretary of State for Defence, articulated a European nuclear doctrine based on the concepts of extended and concerted deterrence. Still, he reasserted that shared deterrence could not be considered.[15] Mitterrand restated France’s sovereignty over its nuclear weapons in May 1994, as he declared that French nuclear weapons were not at everyone’s disposal and depended solely on the French decision.
In 1995, the Chequers formula recognised the inextricable links between the vital interests of France and the UK, establishing the first concrete cooperation between the two nuclear states.[16] This framework was not pursued at a European level, as the creation of a European nuclear deterrence was seen as going against the American umbrella.[17] In June 2001, President Chirac claimed that France was determined to contribute to European security through its deterrence force, accounting for EU solidarity in establishing its vital interests. As with his predecessor, Chirac insisted that the exact outlining of vital interests was ultimately left to the president’s discretion.[18]

For the two decades that followed, limited engagement from European partners materialised. With the Soviet threat dissolved and the American umbrella still firmly open, European nations had little incentive to shoulder the political cost of engaging with French nuclear deterrence. The post-Cold War security dividend made France’s offer feel, to most capitals, like a solution in search of a problem. That calculus would only begin to shift when the umbrella itself came into question. Succeeding presidents continued to reaffirm the European dimension of France’s vital interests, each calling for a European reflection on French deterrence.[19] In his 2020 speech, Macron invited willing European partners to take part in deterrence exercises to develop a shared doctrine, while consistently recalling French sovereignty.[20] Of all European partners, only the UK accepted, joining as an observer, reflecting the limited interest among European nations.
The offer stalled for two reasons that reinforced each other: France was never willing to relinquish control over the trigger, and Europe was never forced to want it.

Having established why the offer stalled for sixty-five years, the question now becomes whether the conditions for its revival are genuinely different. Macron’s speech on the 2nd of March, 2026, followed the same logic his predecessors had long established: greater European cooperation on a nuclear deterrence force whose ultimate decision will always lie in the hands of the French President. Yet, headlines have pointed out a shift in French deterrence doctrine, notably in its European dimension. While France did modify its posture, increasing its warhead count and ending public disclosure of the total, the European dimension of its doctrine remains consistent.[21] Explicitly naming eight partners represents a break from the past, not in French nuclear doctrine, which remains consistent, but in the posture of countries previously too reluctant to engage with it. The eroding Atlantic community has forced European nations to reconsider the architecture of their defence strategy, to the point of questioning US reliability. The 2026 US National Defence Strategy called on Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own defence, signalling a deliberate reduction of American commitment to the continent.[22] Trump has regularly characterised NATO as a paper tiger, conditioned US intervention on transactional agreements, and, more extremely, threatened to invade NATO territory. The reappearance of war on the continent has re-ignited the Russian threat to national sovereignty, and China’s one-sided arms race has compelled a reassessment of the non-proliferation treaties. Macron’s offer has now been accepted by eight European partners, but only time will tell whether this proposal genuinely puts into practice a European doctrine, albeit under French authority, or if the status quo will reassert itself. Before a European doctrine can be completely laid out, its prospects must survive the 2027 presidential elections. Ultimately, if France was never willing to share the final decision, Europe was equally never compelled to engage with the doctrine. The question now is whether what has changed is Europe’s will or simply its fear.

References

^[1] Emmanuel Macron, Discours du Président de la République sur la dissuasion nucléaire de la France, (Île Longue, Brest, France), 2 March 2026, https://uk.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/discours-du-president-sur-la-dissuasion-nucleaire.

^[2] Ibid.

^[3] Bruno Tertrais, French Nuclear Deterrence Policy, Forces, and Future: A Handbook, N°4/2020, Recherches & Documents (Paris: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2020), https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/recherches-etdocuments/2020/202004.pdf.

^[4] Bernard Rogel, French Nuclear Deterrence and Europe, 2025.

^[5] Tertrais, French Nuclear Deterrence Policy, Forces, and Future: A Handbook, N°4/2020.

^[6] Ibid.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] Céline Jurgensen and Dominique Mongin, eds, France and Nuclear Deterrence: A Spirit of Resistance, N°01/2020, Recherches & Documents (Paris: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2020).

^[9] Tertrais, French Nuclear Deterrence Policy, Forces, and Future: A Handbook, N°4/2020.

^[10] Ibid.

^[11] Jacques Isnard, ‘Le grand déballage nucléaire’, Le Monde, 4 February 1997, https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1997/02/04/le-grand-deballage-nucleaire_3740855_1819218.html.

^[12] Tertrais, French Nuclear Deterrence Policy, Forces, and Future: A Handbook, N°4/2020.

^[13] Ibid.

^[14] François Mitterrand, Allocution de M. François Mitterrand, Président de la République, notamment sur la modification de la constitution et la ratification du traité de Maastricht, (Paris), 10 January 1992, https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/130286-allocution-de-m-francois-mitterrand-president-de-la-republique-notamme.

^[15] Jacques Mellick, Discours de M. Jacques Mellick, secrétaire d’État chargé de la défense, sur l’avenir de la dissuasion nucléaire, le désarmement entre les États-Unis et la CEI, l’approche d’une doctrine nucléaire européenne et le concept français d’une dissuasion de ‘stricte suffisance’, (Paris), 29 January 1992, https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/234891-jacques-mellick-29011992-avenir-de-la-dissuasion-nucleaire

^[16] Tertrais, French Nuclear Deterrence Policy, Forces, and Future: A Handbook, N°4/2020.

^[17] Rogel, French Nuclear Deterrence and Europe.

^[18] Jacques Chirac, Discours de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, sur la politique de défense de la France, la stratégie militaire, le désarmement nucléaire, la défense européenne, la réforme du système de défense, les interventions militaires extérieures de la France et la force de dissuasion française, (Paris), 8 June 2001, https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/172860-discours-de-m-jacques-chirac-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-politi.

^[19] Rogel, French Nuclear Deterrence and Europe.

^[20] Emmanuel Macron, Discours du Président Emmanuel Macron sur la stratégie de défense et de dissuasion devant les stagiaires de la 27ème promotion de l’École de guerre, (Paris), 7 February 2020, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/discours-du-president-emmanuel-macron-sur-la-strategie-de-defense-et-de-dissuasion-devant-les-stagiaires-de-la-27eme-promotion-de-lecole-de-guerre.

^[21] Emmanuel Macron, Discours du Président de la République sur la dissuasion nucléaire de la France, (Île Longue, Brest, France), 2 March 2026, https://uk.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/discours-du-president-sur-la-dissuasion-nucleaire.

^[22]United States Department of Defense, 2026 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2026).