Dear reader,

It is perhaps no surprise that this specific quote has seen a rise in usage recently; our times do resemble Gramsci’s. With the collapse of the USSR, the US remained as the world’s sole superpower, a period often described as the unipolar moment. During this period, geopolitics was defined by an axis of relative Western, mainly American, dominance. As liberal democratic institutions expanded across the world, the international economy became increasingly globalized. And to many, it seemed a US-supported rules-based international order would provide the framework for a stable and cooperative international system. This was perhaps most clearly articulated by Francis Fukuyama in The End of History. He argued the ideological conflict of Gramsci’s time was a thing of the past, and democracy and market capitalism would be the world’s final form of political organization.

Now in 2026, these ideas seem well and truly out of time. Globalization, always a process with winners and losers, has started the reverse, as global democracy is in retreat. Western dominance is also fraying. China has emerged as a formidable economic and strategic rival to the US, Russia has returned to an assertive geopolitical posture, and regional powers across the world are asserting their own ambitions in a more contested international system. Meanwhile, international institutions like the UN are under increased pressure in this fragmented environment. Even within the US itself, the adherents of the old system have been replaced by Trumpism, arguably one of the ‘morbid symptoms’ of our time. History, if ever it stopped,has certainly restarted.

The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born: now is the time of monsters.

As such, today we are watching the old-world order die while the new one struggles to be born. In a way, this process can be described as the turning of a kaleidoscope. For a time, the pattern appeared relatively stable, defined by Western and American dominance. As the unipolar structure fades, new geopolitical dynamics are crystallizing in its place: the resurgence of regional power politics, intensifying debates over strategic autonomy, and mounting pressure on international institutions and norms, not least those governing nuclear non-proliferation. As the unipolar order continues to fragment, this rearrangement will continue until a new pattern eventually emerges, whatever that may look like.

The goal of this issue of GA! Magazine is to provide insight into this process of rearrangement. It examines how the fragmentation of the unipolar moment is simultaneously eroding the institutions of the old order and generating new geopolitical dynamics.

The issue opens with an interview with historian Laurien Crump, who reflects on the erosion of NATO and the implications this has for the Transatlantic alliance and Europe’s global position. This is followed by Dirk Focking’s analysis of nuclear sharing, exploring how it has historically been used to further non-proliferation and what lessons this history offers for today’s increasingly complex nuclear landscape. Zooming out to a global perspective, Maximilian Schlenker argues that the weakening of global governance is giving rise to new regional spheres of influence as alternative structures of cooperation, charting the return of regionalism in a fragmenting world order.

The issue opens with an interview with historian Laurien Crump, who reflects on the erosion of NATO and the implications this has for the Transatlantic alliance and Europe’s global position. This is followed by Dirk Focking’s analysis of nuclear sharing, exploring how it has historically been used to further non-proliferation and what lessons this history offers for today’s increasingly complex nuclear landscape. Zooming out to a global perspective, Maximilian Schlenker argues that the weakening of global governance is giving rise to new regional spheres of influence as alternative structures of cooperation, charting the return of regionalism in a fragmenting world order.

The changing dynamics of global power are further explored through Hansung Ryu’s analysis of Sino- Japanese relations, which highlights how historical memory, alliance structures, and debates over strategic autonomy continue to shape geopolitical tensions in East Asia. In a similar vein, Midas van de Weetering’s study of Rwanda analyzes how this small state has used narrative framing strategies to gain status and expand its influence, focusing on its relationship with the UK. Focusing more on policy, William Piras analyzes US influence in South Korea, examining the history of this alliance and how the changing US strategy under Trump influences it. Another article on the South China Sea arbitration case then examines how China’s construction of artificial islands challenges international law and raises broader questions about the effectiveness of international institutions in today’s changing world.

The issue also includes an interview with historian Paschalis Pechlivanis, who discusses if the Balkans have historically functioned as a microcosm of great-power competition and connects this with current geopolitics in the region. Finally, Randy de Jong’s article on Indonesia explores its role as a middle power, showing how it balances between competing Great Powers while drawing on the legacy of the ‘Bandung spirit’.

Together, these contributions show how the fragmentation of the unipolar moment is quickly reshaping global politics across various regions and levels of analysis, providing a multifaceted perspective on a world that is living in the interim.