Date: June 5, 2025
By: Hugo Abrial, Consultant at ABRIAL HDS and chair of GA! & Vali Jamal, Directors of Events
NOTE: This analytical report examines contemporary developments in NATO-Russia relations and Ukraine policy, drawing insights from the public event Deterrence or Dialogue. It provides a complementary analysis by GA! Think Tank, reflecting the views of the authors of this analytical paper. It does not portray the positions of the event panellists nor the Clingendael Institute.
Event Report
This is an analytical report by GA! Think-Tank of the event Deterrence or dialogue? NATO, Ukraine, and the Russian threat, organised by Clingendael and GA! Think-Tank. This public event is part of a series of thematic sessions ahead of the NATO summit in The Hague on 24-25 June 2025. Students, young professionals and other interested discussed the thorny question of NATO’s reaction towards Ukraine and the Russian Threat with a prestigious panel during a Q&A preceding a panel discussion.
Executive Summary: As NATO approaches its 2025 Summit in The Hague, the event Deterrence or Dialogue? NATO, Ukraine, and the Russian Threat brought together experts to explore how the alliance should support Ukraine and challenge an imperialistic Russia. The panel examined Russian propaganda narratives, internal divisions within NATO, and the prospects for dialogue.
Speakers
- Elizaveta Gaufman, Assistant Professor of Russian Discourse and Politics, University of Groningen
- Bob Deen, Head of Security Unit and Senior Research Fellow, Clingendael Institute
- Han Bouwmeester, Full Professor of Operational Military Studies, Netherlands Defence Academy
- Hubert Smeets, journalist and co-founder, Platform RAAM
The panel was moderated by Niels Drost, a Research Fellow and Russian expert at the Clingendael Institute. Several key ideas were discussed in the panel.
General overview
The event “Deterrence or Dialogue? NATO, Ukraine, and the Russian Threat” explored NATO’s response to Russian aggression ahead of the 2025 NATO summit. It was discussed how Russian disinformation narratives frame the war and how by gaining traction globally, these narratives weaken solidarity among members of the alliance. Russia’s narratives gaining influence over actors in Europe and the U.S., contribute to internal divisions within NATO and pose a key challenge to the alliance in formulating a collective response. It was also discussed how Russia’s hybrid imperialism, combining territorial ambition with economic interests shaped its policy toward NATO and Ukraine. Russia’s use of nuclear brinkmanship and cyber warfare pose difficult challenges and force NATO to tread carefully in how it counters these tactics.
The panel discussion gave insights into possible futures for the confrontation with Russia. The conference touched on a range of topics from propaganda narratives to Nuclear Weapons and the possibility of Nuclear Warfare.
The year’s NATO Summit takes place at a time of deep uncertainty as the alliance faces divisions among which member-states are able to contribute how much. Meanwhile Russian propaganda narratives have found influence among members of the current U.S. administration. Russian narratives have also found a voice in Europe with parties like the AFD pushing narratives about the war that undermine NATO’s message. These narratives work to undermine unity within the alliance as misinformation damages trust among allies and makes the collective response weaker.
The threat of nuclear war while small is still greater than it was before. As we face a nuclear power with imperialistic ambitions we must be careful about how we approach the question of deterrence or dialogue. NATO is at a critical juncture in its history. It has new threats with a resurgent and imperialist Russia, new frontiers in the Arctic, and warfare itself is changing through innovations in Cyber warfare.
How NATO responds to these challenges will shape the future of the alliance and of the European continent for generations to come. This is why it is so vital and important to hear from experts and young minds, and those who work directly with the issues we discussed.
It was a privilege to work with Clingendael in bringing together this event and GA Think Tank wants to thank everyone who came to the event, participated in the discussion, and made this event a wonderful way to end the academic year and prepared us, as we approach the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague.
Putin’s turning point
Beginning with the beginning, the unsuccessful management of Western and Russian ties need to be analysed. While exploring the moment when the Russian Federation’s trajectory diverged from that of the West, a few differing opinions on the timing of Putin’s pivotal turning point rose up. The 2007 Munich Security Conference could be seen as the key inflection point, where Putin openly criticized NATO’s eastward expansion into former Eastern Bloc states, including countries directly bordering Russia such as the Baltics. Others point to the 2008 Bucharest Summit where NATO extended membership invitations to several countries and, more significantly, declared that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join the alliance, directly challenging Russiás strategic interests in its near abroad.
However, another explanation was given. The shift could have occurred during the Arab Spring, following the overthrow and public execution of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi. The graphic footage of Gaddafi’s death reportedly had a profound psychological impact on Putin, reinforcing his perception that the West actively seeks regime change against leaders who resist its influence.
This belief significantly hardened Moscow’s stance toward the West, deepening mistrust and fueling an increasingly confrontational foreign policy. Recently, news of Russian troops positioning on the Finnish border while laying new infrastructure in the region forms a direct threat to NATO. Nevertheless, NATO’s dissuasion capabilities and tactics continue to play a significant role in reducing the likelihood of a Russian invasion of a NATO member state. Russia’s meddling with western democracies creating division through sabotage, hybrid attacks or information war is still a preferred method.
Fifth Columns
Building on this increasingly confrontational stance, Russia has developed influence over several political actors and parties in Western democracies, often through informal connections rather than direct, provable corruption.
Today, parties like Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the Alternative for Germany maintain connections to Russia. These parties have a significant chance of gaining power in their respective countries.
Le Pen was recently barred from running in the next election, however polls show her successor, Jordan Bardella performing well in the polls. The AfD meanwhile polls a very close second place in most polls. The FPÖ did win the most seats in the September 2024 parliamentary elections, marking the first time a far-right party has topped the pools in Austria since WWII, they, however, were unable to form a coalition. In short, these parties are closing in on the gap to gain power in their respective countries.
Several public officials in the U.S. Republican Party have also fallen under Russian narrative and influence. There have been a few cases of officials outright convicted of financial crimes such as Paul Manefort and Rick Gates.
Even in Germany’s Social Democratic Party, the SPD, there have been instances of Russian narratives being promoted. Former German Chancellor and SPD leader, Gerhard Schröder sat on the board of Russian energy companies Rosneft and Nord Stream.
Russia is promoting its narrative in Europe, promoting disunity. Even if direct proof of corruption or influence is not always easily traceable, as one of the panelists pointed out, such connections are easily observable.
The text accompanying the picture underlines the shared slavic ethnicity of the Russian and Ukrainian people while expressing the authors incomprehension of Ukrainian resistance and hostility towards Russia. The title is: “Very good poems from our brothers from Ukraine”
Narratives and disinformation
The Kremlin actively promotes a series of narratives about the war that clashes completely with the Western perspective of the war. Firstly, the Kremlin frames the conflict as a war between Russia and the West. Fueling this view are claims that Euromaidan, a series of protests in Ukraine between november 2013 en february 2014, was orchestrated by the West against the Russian federation. Those protests originated when Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign an association agreement with the EU, preferring to have closer ties with Russia. Another dissonance between Western and Russian perspectives is the Russian claim that no war against Ukraine is being waged, only against the West. Indeed, the colour revolutions, according to the Kremlin, are a central play by the West to destabilize regimes to let them adhere to their set of (morally corrupt) values.
The promoted Russian narratives resemble in body to the past USSR narratives about the West. Particularly, a few are easily recognizable and traceable: “The west as imperialist and morally corrupt” (see picture above) or “Western government as deceptive and aggressive” (I.e. Putin’s speech during his meeting with the security council 10/06/2025), or that NATO was seen as an organisation with Nazi ideology.
These narratives have gained traction in a number of places. In the Global South, countries that once suffered from Western colonialism found resonance in these narratives.
In Indonesia, for example, local actors adapted a Russian propaganda cartoon. The original cartoon depicted Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus as sisters, with Ukraine as the troublesome sister. The Indonesian version portrayed Russia and Ukraine as a couple, where Ukraine beat the children representing Donetsk and Luhansk. In this adaptation, Russia appeared to protect the children by taking them away. This version justifies Russia’s actions in Donbas as a protective intervention rather than aggression.
These narratives are built through Russia’s extensive disinformation campaign. Secret Services spreading this is part of the so-called active-measures. The Kremlin mixes falsehoods with partial truths, emphasizing certain elements to manipulate perceptions. This use of disinformation and misinformation creates tensions in Western democracies, increasing pressure on their governments which can influence divisions within the NATO alliance.
As touched upon above, the use of narratives and division tactics by Russia against the west relies partly on history and historical resentment. But while Russia frequently criticizes the West’s colonial past, it has never confronted its own imperial history. In an act of now irony, it was President Putin himself who acknowledged in 1999, shortly before taking power that Russia must reckon with its past.
Today Russia presents a hybrid of this traditional territorial imperialism and more American style capitalist imperialistic tendencies. This hybrid form of Russian imperialism is probably driven not just by the prestige of land but also due to the economic interests of vital companies such as Rosneft and Gazprom. Those ambitions have pushed Putin to hint at the use of nuclear weapons in the Ukraine war, something unimaginable only 15 years ago.
Nevertheless, the actual use of such force remains very small. Historical incidents during the Cold War are a stark reminder of the complex and multi-layered launching process, making a simple impulsive launch impossible. For example, in 1983 a Russian official named Stanislav Petrov refused to believe in the false analyses of a machine and chose not to execute the order, saving the world from a possible nuclear mutually assured destruction.
Putin’s use of brinkmanship diplomacy reminded the world of the existence of the possible use of nuclear weapons as his speeches hinted to the possibility. Apart from sending a political message, it consequently emulsified public apprehension of the consequences of too much Ukrainian support.
Both extremes- the impossible use of the nuclear weapon, or the possible use of the nuclear weapon if Russia is pushed too far- are somewhat misguided. While nuclear war remains extremely unlikely, impossibility is to be excluded. There is a real need for realistic, balanced thinking, through lectures of Russian policy and goals while anticipating its actions.
Divisions in the alliance
Russian communications create dissonance in the West. As Russian narratives influence parts of the political opinion in the West, creating a possible dissonance among the NATO members, some questioned how NATO leaders can justify a political course when faced with such pressures.
Within Europe, the perception of the Russian threat remains a difficult question. Juggling with different prominent national issues, the legitimation discourse of direct Russian threat to Europe suffices not to create a unified response to the threat. There is a clear difference in threat perception in Eastern-Europe and other European countries. Therefore, on the question of Ukraine’s NATO admission, different visions exist. Seeing Ukraine as a European shield, sacrificing themselves as protector against Russian aggression, some see adhesion as normal, and necessary. Russia is then seen as an inherently imperialist and existential threat to NATO and its members, which results in them arguing for firm resistance. Others, abhorring this Realist view and approach, sympathise with Russian actions and consequently oppose the idea of Ukrainian admission. This view is often supported by beliefs that engagement and business can resolve tensions. This view resonates among U.S. Republicans, past German SPD leaders, and European far-right parties. Pragmatists believe in the necessity of supporting Ukraine with reservations. While seeing the threat, pragmatists often remain open to negotiations. The Arctic Council shows that limited dialogue with Russia remains possible in critical areas.
How one interprets the Russian threat fundamentally shapes their stance on how to confront it. These three dominant perspectives—confrontation, accommodation, and containment, possibly reflect deeper ideological divides about the nature of the Russian state and the appropriate Western response. Additionally as the nature of war changes, Western responses need to evolve with it, creating an additional challenge for the Alliance.
Indeed, the relatively quick transformation of war, incorporating now hybrid warfare, represents a significant strategic challenge for the West, for which existing frameworks remain inadequate. The blurred threshold between conventional conflict and non-kinetic operations, particularly in the realm of cyberattacks, complicates decisions on proportional responses. Key questions remain unresolved: should cyber aggression be met with conventional military force or with reciprocal cyber measures? The absence of established doctrine in this domain underscores the need for comprehensive strategic adaptation to address this evolving threat landscape. This need for strategic clarity also extends to the broader questions surrounding European security and defence cooperation within transatlantic structures.
In this context of evolving security challenges, an European pillar within NATO remains an attractive option for a more integration commitment and agile response to these challenges. While this idea was proposed in the 1970s and 80s by Dutch politician Hans van Mierlo, it received only a mild support in the Netherlands as it largely committed to its Atlanticist foreign policy establishment.
Concluding remarks
This critical NATO summit is happening in an era marked by hybrid threats, internal divergence and renewed nuclear rhetoric, blending historical grievances, economic interests and disinformation tactics. It has and will continue to reshape the European and the world’s security landscape. Yet this moment als presents an opportunity: for NATO to come together and tackle those challenges, defying the words of Macron that NATO is braindead. Dialogue must be measured, deterrence must be credible, and unity must be built not just through power, but through narrative and purpose. For younger generations, whose voices are rising in the policy arena, this is not just a diplomatic challenge but a generational one. The credibility of the west will not only be judged by what it defends but by how coherently it tells the story it stands for. In that aspect, history is unmistakably the teacher.
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