Will the Radical Right Moderate?

Will the Radical Right Moderate?

The results are in, and they could not be clearer: Victor Orbán’s far-right populism has been resoundingly beaten at the ballot box, with his center-right opponent Peter Magyar securing a sweeping two-thirds majority for his Tisza party in parliament. Yet as Hungary looks towards a post-Orbán future, we should not forget about the events that led us here.

Political movements have long been analyzed through what is called the “Inclusion-Moderation Thesis”, the idea that, as radical political parties are included in elections and eventually governments, they begin moderating. It presents a compelling narrative: Radical parties, while initially gaining support by idealistic proclamations and revolutionary zeal, are eventually forced to make compromises as they join into coalitions, and try to broaden their electoral appeal. It is as if they strike an implicit deal: Participation for moderation.[1]

It may thus seem a bit surprising that the last decade of radical right ascendance in Europe has seen little of this expected moderation. Sure, some of them, such as Giorgia Meloni or Marine Le Pen, may have softened their public image. Yet both still make no secret of their radical ambitions: Meloni’s attempts to bring Italy’s judiciary to heel reveal a thoroughly illiberal vision of her country’s future.[2] In the case of Victor Orbán, the dynamic was even inverted, with the soon-to-be former Hungarian prime minister having come to power as a moderate centrist who eventually radicalized into a polarizing right-populist.

This raises the question: Will the radical right moderate, or will the current trend of radicalization continue? Let’s get to the core of this.

On November 9th, 1918, the German Republic was proclaimed (twice) in Berlin. Its turbulent early years saw a deluge of violent extremism, marked by civil unrest, coup attempts and bloody government crackdowns. Infamously, this Republic, later known by its mocking epithet of the “Weimar Republic”, ended with the National Socialist Worker’s Party of Germany (NSDAP, or Nazi Party) under Adolf Hitler being handed dictatorial power, ultimately leading to world war and industrial genocide.

It may therefore seem somewhat strange to look to the Weimar Republic for examples of radical right moderation – after all, it would not be an exaggeration to say that 1930s Germany is the most infamous example of right-wing radicalization and democratic collapse. However, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly given our image of the Doomed Republic, the Nazi Party only entered the stage of Weimar German politics during its final years, following the 1929 global economic collapse that would ultimately be known as the Great Depression.[3] Before the sudden rise of the NSDAP, the main radical right party of the German Republic was the monarchist German National People’s Party, or DNVP. During the young Republic’s early years, the rabidly antisemitic and staunchly reactionary DNVP maintained close connections to putschist organizations and insurgent paramilitaries such as the Stahlhelm. The DNVP’s stance on the Republic was clear: rejection. And indeed, towards the final years of the Republic, the DNVP would play a crucial role in paving the way towards Hitler’s rise to power, entering into Weimar Germany’s final democratically elected government as a junior partner under the NSDAP.

Yet the Republic’s turbulent beginning and dramatic end often obscure a period that has traditionally been referred to as the “Golden Years”[4] by historians. While still marked by societal fragmentation and polarization along confessional and class lines,[5] this period also saw the consolidation of the Republic: Political violence largely subsided, the economy improved, and urban culture flourished.[6] For a moment, it seemed like the future belonged to democracy, and that the world of kings and emperors was one of the past. It was in this environment that the DNVP began to, inch by inch, integrate into the civil society and political structures of the young Republic. During this period, the DNVP entered into government and contributed to constructive policy work. Much to the shock of both its political allies and opponents, the DNVP even voted to extend the “Law for the Protection of the Republic” in 1927, which was explicitly designed to target monarchist and reactionary anti-democratic organizations – values which the DNVP was nominally founded on.[7]

To understand these pivots, from extremist reactionaries to establishment party and back again, it is important to understand the political environment of the time. The Weimar right was highly heterogeneous, both in in its elites and base. Its elites included everything from reactionary aristocratic nationalists to masculinist anarchists, to an extent that some scholars argue that there is more separating the “Weimar right” than uniting them.[8] This fits with the general character of politics during the Weimar Republic: Far from a linear path from instability to Nazi dictatorship, the 1920s were a period of radical political open-endedness, marked by a wide range of competing visions of Germany’s political future.[9]

In this competitive environment, appeals to king and country held less sway than they did during the Empire, as the DNVP learned through early electoral defeats. The Emperor fleeing to the Netherlands left monarchists without a monarch, and the failure of the Kapp Putsch at the hands of striking workers left the vision of an officers’ dictatorship discredited. In order to remain relevant, the DNVP thus aimed to broaden its base from nostalgic aristocrats to middle- and even working-class constituencies.[10] Reflecting the diversity of the Weimar-era political right, it thus became a heterogenous patchwork of reactionary landholding elites, religious conservatives, ethnonationalists, and pragmatic interest groups such as Christian labor unions.[11] Even de-facto feminist organizations were part of the DNVP’s coalition: Despite its initial opposition to women voting, the DNVP quickly realized the strategic advantage of appealing to the conservative female electorate, which proved receptive to the nurturing imagery of religious traditionalism.[12] This diverse coalition of different actors forced discussion and compromise within the party. Furthermore, its inclusion of pragmatic interest groups meant that parts of the DNVP began establishing communication channels with other organizations, such as more liberal farmers’ associations. Thus, its organizational diversity exerted a moderating force on its politics, controlling radical elements within the party.[13]

As the 1920s continued, significant parts of the DNVP developed concerns about the difficulties of trying to affect political change from the opposition: Would this not mean yielding vital influence over policy change to their ideological adversaries, the Social Democrats?[14] Therefore, the DNVP became amenable towards joining the Bürgerblock coalition with conservative and outright left-liberal parties, and towards working relatively constructively within it. This did not mean that the DNVP lost its antisemitism or its vitriolically xenophobic polemics, even as it began to work within democratic structures.[15] Indeed, several scholars doubt the sincerity of their moderation, viewing it primarily as a pragmatic tool to implement their policies during a time in which they simply did not have the means to overthrow the current order.[16] While there may therefore be some doubt on the DNVP’s true motives, the result is still clear: Throughout much of the 1920s, the DNVP effectively moderated towards a policy of tolerance of the democratic order.

So, why did this moderation not stick? From 1928 onwards, the DNVP re-radicalized, returning to general opposition to the republic as a system, before being effectively absorbed into the NSDAP towards the end of its life.

There are multiple reasons for this development. Most immediately, their internal party politics changed drastically. Exploiting a leadership vacuum, DNVP financier and media mogul Alfred Hugenberg muscled his way into the position of party leader, claiming vast power over the party’s operations. Hugenberg quickly began purging and alienating more moderate elements within the organization. This meant a drastic homogenization of the previously diverse movement around its most ethnonationalist and antirepublican elements.[17] As a political strategy, this was a dramatic failure, with the DNVP reduced to single-digit election results for the rest of its existence.[18] However, this alone does not explain why this party was willing to enter a devil’s bargain with someone as nakedly power-hungry as Hugenberg, who made little effort to hide his ambitions of reshaping the party to his liking.

For one, a large part of the DNVP’s appeal before entering into government laid in its anti-establishment status. As a party that presented itself as an outsider to the current order, it thus benefited from protest votes from those dissatisfied with the ruling parties. Thus, entering into government meant giving up an important part of its appeal.[19] This image of a previously anti-establishment party becoming absorbed into the system was probably not helped by the fact that both the DNVP’s allies and enemies presented their willingness to compromise as capitulation to the Weimar system.[20] Therefore, the DNVP was under significant pressure to prove its political independence and reassert its anti-establishment status to try and remain politically competitive.

Furthermore, another element that likely shaped the DNVP’s re-radicalization was the narrative environment of the late Weimar Republic. In the later years of the Republic, dramatic “either-or” narratives gained in popularity: Slogans such as “Socialism or Barbarism!”, “Dictatorship or Doom!” and “Eden or Golgatha!”[21] dominated headlines and posters. This indicates a hardening of political fronts: There is little room for compromise between heaven and hell. In such an environment, making any sort of concession in the name of political consensus can easily be presented as moral corruption and fatal weakness.

So, what might this mean for the radical right today? While circumstances may have changed quite significantly from those in Germany a century ago, the case of the DNVP nonetheless points us towards some things to look out for when examining the prospects of right-wing moderation in the present day.

The first is that of party homogeneity. The story of the DNVP’s capture by Hugenberg, of its transformation from a diverse coalition of groups that had to enter compromises with each other into a homogenous ethnonationalist organization, highlights how party structures can affect the shape of their platforms. Under this light, many European populist parties seem less likely to moderate their policies in the near future: Throughout the last ten years, the German AfD publicly underwent cycles of radicalization during which more moderate wings of the party, such its original right-liberal anti-Eurozone core, were purged or alienated from the party. Geert Wilders’ PVV is another example of this: In a party with only one official member, there is little need for compromise between different groups.

Second, there can be situations during which far-right parties that participate in ruling coalitions are not just under pragmatic pressures to moderate, but also to retain a radical outsider image in order to maintain their existing voter base. While this may have failed in the case of the DNVP, parties today clearly still make this consideration: When the PVV entered into the previous Dutch government as its largest party, Wilders made sure to stay away from cabinet positions. Instead, he performed a sort of opposition role, railing against the ineffectiveness of the coalition which his one-man party was the largest member of. The DNVP shows that, from a strategic perspective, there can be cases in which government participation need not mean permanent constructive moderation.

The third element to be sensitive towards is the way that national discourses affect the room for political maneuver for far-right parties. The late Weimar years saw an increasing polarization of German political discourse that made it increasingly difficult for parties to engage in compromise and moderation without appearing unprincipled, hypocritical or weak. Much has been written about the polarizing effect of social media on voters – what the case of the DNVP highlights is that even if far-right politicians today would want to work constructively on affairs of governance, they may avoid doing so where they fear that it could erode their populist standing.

In short, the case of the DNVP illustrates that, while radical right parties certainly can and have moderated their policy platforms and have worked constructively within democratic structures, they can also be subject to a variety of conditions drawing them towards taking and maintaining more radical positions. In the current climate of European politics, it thus seems unlikely that radical right parties will moderate significantly anytime soon.

Footnotes

[1] Tepe, Sultan. “The Inclusion-Moderation Thesis: An Overview.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, by Sultan Tepe. Oxford University Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.788.

[2] POLITICO. “Italian PM Giorgia Meloni Loses Referendum.” March 23, 2026. https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-pm-giorgia-meloni-set-to-narrowly-lose-referendum/.

[3] Weitz, Eric D. Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy, Weimar Centennial Edition. Princeton University Press, 2018.

[4] Weitz, Weimar Germany

[5] Childers, Thomas. The Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919 – 1933. 4. ed. Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1990.

[6] Weitz, Weimar Germany, Kershaw, Ian. Hitler. Taylor & Francis Group, 2000. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uunl/detail.action?docID=1710569.

[7] Mergel, Thomas. “Das Scheitern des Deutschen Tory-Konservatismus.” Die Umformung Der DNVP Zu Einer Rechtsradikalen Partei 1928-1932, Historische Zeitschrift, vol. 276, no. 1 (2003): 323–68. https://doi.org/10.1524/hzhz.2003.276.jg.323.

[8] Breuer, Stefan. “Die ‘Konservative Revolution’ – Kritik eines Mythos.” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 1990. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24197017.

[9] Fritzsche, Peter. “Did Weimar Fail?” The Journal of Modern History 68, no. 3 (1996): 629–56. JSTOR.

[10] Childers, The Nazi Voter

[11] Mergel, Scheitern des Deutschen Tory-Konservatismus

[12] Streubel, Radikale Nationalistinnen

[13] Childers, The Nazi Voter

[14] Childers, The Nazi Voter

[15] Ibid.

[16] See Streubel, Radikale Nationalistinnen

[17] Mergel, Scheitern des Deutschen Tory-Konservatismus

[18] Childers, Nazi Voter

[19] Ibid.

[20] Mergel, Scheitern des Deutschen Tory-Konservatismus

[21] Graf, Rüdiger. “Either-Or: The Narrative of ‘Crisis’ in Weimar Germany and in Historiography.” Central European History 43, no. 4 (2010): 592–615. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008938910000725. p.605

List of Sources

Tepe, Sultan. “The Inclusion-Moderation Thesis: An Overview.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, by Sultan Tepe. Oxford University Press, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.788.

POLITICO. “Italian PM Giorgia Meloni Loses Referendum.” March 23, 2026. https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-pm-giorgia-meloni-set-to-narrowly-lose-referendum/.

Weitz, Eric D. Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy, Weimar Centennial Edition. Princeton University Press, 2018.

Streubel, Christiane. “Radikale Nationalistinnen: Agitation und Programmatik rechter Frauen in der Weimarer Republik.” Geschichte und Geschlechter 55. Campus, 2006.

Childers, Thomas. The Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919 – 1933. 4. ed. Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1990.

Mergel, Thomas. “Das Scheitern des Deutschen Tory-Konservatismus.” Die Umformung Der DNVP Zu Einer Rechtsradikalen Partei 1928-1932, Historische Zeitschrift, vol. 276, no. 1 (2003): 323–68. https://doi.org/10.1524/hzhz.2003.276.jg.323.

Breuer, Stefan. “Die ‘Konservative Revolution’ – Kritik eines Mythos.” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 1990. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24197017.

Fritzsche, Peter. “Did Weimar Fail?” The Journal of Modern History 68, no. 3 (1996): 629–56. JSTOR.

Graf, Rüdiger. “Either-Or: The Narrative of ‘Crisis’ in Weimar Germany and in Historiography.” Central European History 43, no. 4 (2010): 592–615. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008938910000725. p.605

ELIAS GERNDT-EISENHOWER