The Collapse of Oslo and Israel’s Far-Right Surge

This interview, conducted by Pepijn Lapidaire in November 2024, features insights from Dr Peter Malcontent, a lecturer and researcher at Utrecht University. Dr Malcontent specializes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the history of human rights. His notable works include “Facing the Past: Amending Historical Injustices through Instruments of Transitional Justice” (2016) and “Een open zenuw. Nederland, Israël & Palestina” (2018). The views expressed are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the interviewer or Utrecht University.

Could you describe the political turn in Israel from the collapse of the Oslo Accords in 2000 to this government with these extremist forces?

Yes, what is important to put first, the West easily makes the mistake of thinking that there was once an Israel in which a majority of Israelis had some degree of empathy towards the Palestinians. There wasn’t. It has actually been ‘us or them’ from the beginning. The Labour Zionists, who founded the State of Israel in 1948, always had a hard time with that. They found that difficult, they were always a bit opaque about it too. But when push came to shove, for them too it was, ‘us or them.’ So even Labour prime ministers like Golda Meir have often enough said, ‘What are Palestinians? they don’t exist.’

On the right, people have always been clearer about this. There they have always said, ‘We can only negotiate with the Palestinians when they are defeated. We both want the same piece of land, so either they win or we win.’ That is Vladimir Jabotinsky’s Ironwall doctrine. He was a very right-wing Zionist in the 1930s, he separated himself from the normal Zionist movement and said, ‘that’s just the way it is, [‘us or them’] let’s not beat around the bush.’ And that thinking underlies how the Likud party views the Palestinian issue.

So, Netanyahu is an heir to Jabotinsky. But, at different points in time, you see Israeli politicians making different choices about how they deal with the Palestinian issue. During the First Intifada in the second half of the 1980s, they saw: violence doesn’t work now. Then the realisation slowly dawned, maybe we should try something else after all. Just violence doesn’t work, we also have to negotiate.

In the West, we thought that eventually at the end of those Oslo Accords, Israel would also automatically agree to a Palestinian state. We in the West started deluding ourselves because that was not the case. Now, I do think that certain Israeli governments in that period would have eventually accepted a Palestinian state, but that would always have been a Palestinian state whose independence would be such that you couldn’t actually call it a truly independent state. In the case of an Israeli-style Palestinian state, the Palestinians would have very limited control over their own borders and their own territory and would be limited in collecting their own tax revenues.

That is the perspective with which many Israelis have always looked at a Palestinian state. They started negotiating because they saw: violence alone doesn’t work. Well, they negotiated for ten years, that too came to nothing. Then those right-wing forces in Israeli society said, with Likud, Sharon and Netanyahu leading the way, then let’s use violence. Netanyahu has actually always said: no two-state solution and if necessary, we will strike back. That sentiment has become increasingly extreme, and what Israel has been doing since 7 October is quite extreme even by Israeli standards. So, one has to conclude that, on the Palestinian issue, there has been a far-right shift in Israeli politics.

The right are the hawks and negotiations on anything resembling a Palestinian state is more on the left. But on the left, it is not the case that people always thought: ah, poor Palestinians, we should do something for them.

What has always been paramount for Israel, left and right, is: the Palestinians are a security issue. It’s not a human rights issue, it’s a security issue. And you can solve that in two ways: by force or by negotiation. The left wing often favoured negotiations; the right wing favoured violence. After Oslo, that hawkish thinking, foreign policy is security, security, security and more security, continued to grow.

At the same time, you see that Israel has become a more right-wing country not only on the security front, but also domestically. This has been going on in Israel for 20 years, particularly since the rise of Netanyahu, but it is a process that has been dormant for some time. This rise of right-wing forces has been largely determined by demographic phenomena. The Jewish-Israeli part of Israeli society started to change in terms of its composition. For a long time, European Jews had the upper hand. Almost all of them voted Labour. A large group of new Jews joined them immediately after Israel’s independence. These are the Arab Jews. They came to Israel after 1948. They did not initially have much of a say. In the 1970s, when Likud began to emerge in the Israeli political scene, these Arab Jews started voting Likud. Not because they were necessarily right-wing, but out of frustration at not being taken seriously by the Labour party. They were seen as second-class Jews. That helped the advance of the right and in the 1980s Likud came to power more often. Then Labour returned one more time in the 1990s with the Oslo Accords and after that it was basically downhill. The all- powerful Labour party, who used to be able to govern on their own, they now have about three or four seats.

Then you also have many Russian Jews emigrating to Israel after the Cold War, then you also have a rise in the number of ultra-Orthodox Jews and then also a big rise in extreme nationalist or ultra-right-wing Jews. Sometimes with religious aspects like Smotrich. Sometimes just pure ultra-right, as you see with a figure such as Ben-Gvir. This is how Israel became more right-wing because of demographics.

Ben Gvir and Smotrich are often cited as examples of that far-right. In what ways are they more right-wing than Netanyahu, and what are ideas at play in that additional right- wing, ultra-Orthodox group?

First, you should not confuse those ultra-right- wing parties with those ultra-Orthodox parties. The influence of the ultra-Orthodox is rising because the number of ultra-Orthodox Jews is rising. You can see this in current politics as well, for example by exempting Orthodox Jews from conscription. The non-Orthodox Jews want this gone because now only they have had to fight. But some of those ultra-Orthodox parties are in government and they don’t want that and so they block that exemption from being scrapped. Those ultra-Orthodox parties demand that Netanyahu not extend the conscription. This causes tensions in the Knesset among the opposition, but there are also politicians within Likud who believe that this exception is unacceptable. But Netanyahu is happy to accommodate those ultra-Orthodox parties. Because if he doesn’t, his government could fall. And those ultra-orthodox parties are different parties from the ultra-right-wing parties.

Those two ultra-right-wing parties of Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, they dream of a great Israel. A great Israel like the Biblical kingdom of ancient Israel. That means they want all of Palestine. So both Gaza and the West Bank and a bit of Lebanon. They also want Israel to be an ethnically pure state. A true Jewish nation-state with no room for Arabs or Palestinians. There is of course a strong religious element in this, but faith is not the most important thing to them, but it does play a part. Because only by referring to faith can they also refer to the ancient Biblical Kingdom of Israel. So, the two things intertwine. They use faith to claim the West Bank and Gaza. The West Bank in particular is the most important. They also don’t talk about the West Bank but about Judea and Samaria. And they want it at all costs. So that also means eventual deportation of Palestinians.

Are those ideas also the distinguishing element between Ben-Gvir, Smotrich and Netanyahu?

Those ultra-right-wing parties and Likud too, they have been very successful in hammering home in Israeli society that it’s all about security, security, security. So, Netanyahu too does not want to give up the occupied territories, but there is still mainly a security idea behind that and not necessarily a religious or ideological one. Likud is not a religious party; it is a secular party. But its allies want the same thing, but for a different reason. There is a mixture of nationalism and religion. Likud and those extremists can find each other. Together, these have sent a message to Israeli society: we must do everything to ensure Israel’s security. That means that we can never leave the occupied territories and that by definition every Arab country should be seen as an enemy until proven otherwise. Until you conclude an Abraham Accord type of deal with it, for example.

Defence Minister Gallant was recently sacked. How fragile is the current coalition at the moment? When new elections are held, do you expect Israel to shift even further to the right? Or that something of a correction will happen?

This coalition has been fragile since it took office, as they do not have a large majority in the Knesset, only a few seats. Netanyahu can of course stay in office with that minimal majority and he is willing to go very far for this. The latest example of this is indeed Gallant’s resignation. It is not just the result of shady coalition politics.

If elections were held at this time, Likud could win. That is remarkable because we did not think so six or seven months ago. So, what you see is that because of Israel’s recent military successes, Likud and also Netanyahu are on the rise again. But if elections are held now and if Likud were to win, they will again have to rely on the same coalition partners. Because the other parties, in the opposition, Gantz’s and Lapid’s parties, they are not contemplating joining the government with Netanyahu for a second. So, then he will have to knock on the doors of those extremists again anyway.

It could go two ways. It could be that Netanyahu serves out the term and then there are new elections and he wins them. But that he may not manage to find enough support among his current coalition colleagues. That means that the current opposition could start forming a coalition. Suppose that succeeds, one might ask: would that change course?

Then you come back to what I said earlier about domestic politics. The opposition parties are democratic parties. That is, democratic parties primarily for the Jewish-Israeli part of the population and within these parties there is also a certain respect for the Arab population within Israel. So internally, it would be good news for the democratic institutions in Israel.

Because they would not implement those constitutional reforms?

Yes, correct. In Israel, when you talk about the right, it’s not just about security politics, it’s also about internal politics. What those ultra-right- wing parties have in common, along with those ultra-Orthodox parties and a growing part of Likud, is that they actually want more leeway and don’t want to be constantly called back by the Supreme Court or by the highest prosecutor in Israel. And the Supreme Court and the top prosecutor in Israel relatively have a lot of power because Israel doesn’t have a proper constitution. So that’s what Likud and the extremists want to get rid of. In a country that has no real constitution, that means an attack on democracy. So, with a coalition consisting of the current opposition, that will not happen.

With regard to the Palestinians, those parties will be slightly more inclined to lend an ear to the international community. Because they do tend to look a bit further ahead. But that doesn’t mean that they are suddenly in favour of a Palestinian state or suddenly say, well, with Iran, all is forgotten and forgiven. They too are tough about it either way. So, the idea that if the opposition comes to power, then it will all be different: forget it. It will all be slightly less bad than in the case of a new ultra-right government with Netanyahu. But there won’t be much difference on the Palestinian issue.

And if Netanyahu stays in power, then it will stay this way. And will anything change? Well, I don’t think so for now. A large part of the Israeli population has a lot of trouble with those internal reforms. But don’t forget that there are also many Israelis, who don’t take to the streets, who think it’s all fine. And the polls show that too. So, it’s really not the case that in the very short term the far-right in Israel will just lose momentum.

How do you expect that to affect Israel’s international reputation? In what is called the Global South, they already have a negative reputation. But could that reputation with traditional allies break down too?

That reputation has already taken hits, of course. But certainly, those on the right and Israel in general don’t care that much what the rest of the world thinks about them. As long as they know they can keep key strategic allies behind them. The Americans, that is, and if the European Union is behind them, that’s a nice little bonus. As long as they are supported by the Americans, they don’t much care what everybody else thinks.

What is also noteworthy, Israeli foreign policy and also security policy is never a long-term strategy. It’s all short-term. This is not very surprising. From an Israeli perspective, they have been at war since the state’s inception. Countries at war never have a long-term perspective. This also explains the Israeli actions in Gaza and against Hezbollah. Shoot first and ask questions later. An idea about solving it structurally, should you not only fight but also want something else, that is not important right now. That’s how they look at the rest of the world too. You have also heard Netanyahu say that often enough in the past year: ‘whether our allies like it or not, we are just doing what is necessary for us.’ For Netanyahu, the most important thing is, as long as he can keep the Americans behind him, it’s fine. More is always nice but is not necessary and he is also pragmatic enough to know when this war is over and we are another five years down the line nobody is talking about it anymore.

It is often forgotten that there is a substantial Arab minority within Israel. Could you elaborate on their role in this whole political violence?

Yes, it’s a relatively small group which again is made up of different groups. So you have, for example, Bedouins, other groups, Palestinian Arabs. It is not a unity and it is a minority. They basically have the right to vote and can be part of the political order in Israel, but they are not allowed in the army. Mostly, one has to read between the lines. Especially socially economically, Palestinian Arabs in practice are simply less well off than their fellow Jewish citizens. At the same time, some of those Palestinian Arabs have established a degree of social security and prosperity which they would never achieved in the occupied territories. So it’s not like all Palestinian Arabs are waiting for an independent Palestinian state that they would also have to go to.

So that does make them more cautious than Palestinians in the occupied territories. So, you cannot automatically lump Palestinians in Israel with Palestinians in the occupied territories. Palestinians in Israel, despite being second-class citizens, have something to lose. But they too, of course, are watching with suspicion the far-right movement taking place in Israel.

Two years ago, following the riots on the Haram al-Sharif, the Temple Mount, we also saw Palestinian Arabs in Israel taking to the streets. That had never happened before. Palestinian Arabs in Israel itself had always kept quiet but then did take to the streets for the first time. They too, of course, are worried. If Israeli Jews are worried about the democratic nature of the state of Israel, Palestinian Arabs have even more to worry about. Because if they will soon be at the mercy of ultra-right-wing governments that can no longer be called back by the judiciary when things get too crazy, they could of course fall victim to this.