Armenia’s Strategy after Nagorno-Karabakh

In 2018 Armenia had its own Velvet Revolution which swept out old elites from power and brought in a more democratic-minded government under Nikol Pashinyan. Pashinyan, an Armenian parliamentarian, rose to power by leading a wave of demonstrations that forced the resignation of the Armenian Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan. Sargsyan, who had served as President of Armenia for 10 years, had tried to prolong his power but failed. Pashinyan was appointed prime minister in May 2018 and subsequently won an overwhelming majority in the December 2018 Parliamentary elections. This was a rare case of an Armenian election being recognised by international observers as free and fair. [120]

Interestingly, unlike other revolutions like the Ukrainian Euromaidan Revolution in 2014, the Velvet Revolution did not start out as anti-Russian. As indicated by Pashinyan’s 5-year plan adopted in February 2019, the Armenian government was focused on domestic issues like corruption, overturning the market-share of the previous oligarchic system and establishing a level playing field for business. [121]

The current historiography on Armenia’s foreign policy since Pashinyan’s rise to power has focused on the idea that Armenia, wanting to increase its autonomy vis-a-vis Russia, ironically ended up being drawn closer to its traditional ally. As Pashinyan outlined in his third key point in a speech in 2018 before Armenia’s parliament, Armenia’ primary foreign policy goal had been focused on achieving internal and external security for Armenia and “Artsakh” (the term Armenian nationalists use for Nagorno-Karabakh). [122] Nagorno-Karabakh is under international law part of Azerbaijan. [123] However, historically at least 80% of the population has been ethnically Armenian. [124] In the First Nagorno-Karabakh War that ended with the ceasefire in 1994 Armenia gained controlled over Nagorno-Karabakh and large parts of adjacent Azerbaijani territories. Armenia continued to fully occupy all of these until the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 when Azerbaijan recaptured parts of Nagorno-Karabakh and virtually all the adjacent occupied Azerbaijani territories. [125]

Unfortunately for Pashinyan’s ambitions, his previous anti-Russian rhetoric during his time in the Armenian political opposition made him untrustworthy in Russian eyes. [126] Because Russia perceived him as pro-Western, it is likely that it let Azerbaijan know that it would tolerate an Azerbaijani attack (within limits) into Nagorno-Karabakh. Consequently, after a war in September-November 2020, Azerbaijan regained large parts of the territory while Russia gained the right to station peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. [127]

Due to the South Caucasus being extremely dynamic in the past four years however, the historiography has not yet had time to incorporate the events leading up to Azerbaijan’s offensive retaking the remainder of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. This essay posits that taking into account events in 2022-2023 would show that Armenia’s reliance on Russia to maintain its control over Nagorno-Karabakh has been an unequivocal failure. This is why Pashinyan declared in June 2024 that Armenia will formally withdraw from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). [128] In light of these changes in the South Caucasus, this paper seeks to reevaluate Armenia’s foreign policy during Azerbaijan’s retaking of Karabakh (September 2020-September 2023) as Armenia trying to increase its room for maneuver by leveraging derivative power gained from Russia through appealing to Russia itself and organizations it is part of like the CSTO.

Scholars from the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung think tank have previously looked at how Armenia has tried to increase its room for maneuver by maintaining a balance between the EU and Russian-led institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union, both under Pashinyan and previous Armenian governments. [129] However, one underexplored area of research is applying Tom Long’s concept of derivative power to a situation where it has clearly failed. Using derivative power as a framework for Armenia’s evolving margins for maneuver in the final stages of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (2020-2023) would bring further nuance to Armenia’s changing use of derivative power.

To carry out this research, I will mainly use primary sources that contain statements from the Pashinyan administration (especially from the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia archives) discussing the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia’s position. As the main focus of this paper is Armenia’s relationship with Russia, these sources are reliable as they are either official documents by key Armenian officials or newspapers reporting on these officials’ statements. One limitation is that I do not speak Armenian. Because not all official Armenian sources have been translated the selection of Armenian sources is limited by what the Armenian government or Armenian and international news outlets have deemed important. Moreover, these sources being mainly pro Pashinyan will obviously be biased in presenting his actions in as positive a light as possible. The secondary literature will mitigate these problems.

This paper will cover the period September 2020 to September 2023, being split into four parts to explain the theoretical framework and analyse key parts of the final phases of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. First, explaining derivative power and applying it to Armenia’s relationship with Russia.

DERIVATIVE POWER: ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN, AND RUSSIA

Tom Long has defined derivative power as “Lacking significant material capabilities of their own, small states may derive power by convincing larger states to take actions that boost their interests.” The base of this power constitutes the relationship between a small state and its great power ally. This can allow the smaller state to potentially extract resources, such as military aid. [130] In the twenty-first century Armenia has had to rely on power derived from Russia to dissuade Azerbaijan from attacking Armenian-occupied territory. This is because of particular-intrinsic power, which Long has identified as instrumentalizing inherent characteristics like population, territory, GDP and military as potential bases of power. Hydrocarbons, like oil and gas, are one famous form of particular-intrinsic power. [131]

At a particular-intrinsic level Armenia has been at disadvantage vis-a-vis Azerbaijan. As Edward Erickson has noted, at the strategic level Azerbaijan “is more powerful in every meaningful way than” Armenia. In 2019, Azerbaijan had a population of 10.3 million, a real GDP of $145.2 billion, 67,000 total active military personnel and a military budget of $5.8 billion. This power is possible because of Azerbaijan’s demographics and because it exported a lot of crude oil and produced large amounts of natural gas. In contrast, Armenia had a smaller population and was not blessed with hydrocarbons. In 2019, Armenia had a population of 3 million, a real GDP of $40.4 billion, 45,000 total active military personnel and a military budget of $1.6 billion. [132]

Because of this great particular-intrinsic power divergence, Armenia has usually relied on derivative power. During Pashinyan’s first five years in power, this has meant mainly relying on Russia specifically and institutions that Russia is part of such the OSCE Minsk Group to maintain the status quo of de facto Armenian control in Nagorno-Karabakh. For example, in a speech to the Council of Europe in April 2019, Pashinyan declared that “the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs are the only ones to deal with the Karabakh conflict. [133] Furthermore, legally through the CSTO treaty, Armenia had the right to collective defence from Russia in case there was a “menace to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty.” [134] Russia has helped Armenian defence several times, both directly and indirectly. In 1992, Russian troops helped Armenian separatists in carrying out the Khojaly massacre of Azerbaijanis. Russian mediation also directly contributed to the ceasefire in 1994 that permitted Armenia to occupy parts of Azerbaijan’s territory. In 2016, Russia provided a $200 million loan to Armenia for it to strengthen its military. Yerevan also purchased equipment from Russia, including laser reconnaissance devices and unmanned aerial vehicles, in preparation for war with Azerbaijan. Despite these precedents, things would begin to unravel unexpectedly in 2020.

THE SECOND NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR AND CEASEFIRE

On 27 September 2020, Azerbaijan began a full-scale war with Armenia which lasted forty-four days. Its result was a disaster for Armenia. The Armenian-aligned Nagorno-Karabakh government lost about 75% of its territory that it had controlled for twenty-six years, 25% of which it lost during the war itself and the rest when it handed it over to Azerbaijan following the ceasefire. Azerbaijan in total regained more than 10,000 square kilometres of its territory because of this war. [135]

On 10 November, a ceasefire agreement exclusively brokered by Russia was signed between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. This included stationing Russian peacekeepers for an agreed upon and renewable period of five years in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the Lachin Corridor (the only road that connects Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia proper). [136] By agreeing to Russian peacekeepers and Russian mediation, Pashinyan was able to preserve Armenian control for the time being of 25% of Nagorno-Karabakh. Nonetheless, Armenia was unable to derive power from Russia to win this war. Pashinyan also failed in his earlier explicit goal of maintaining security for the other 75% of Nagorno-Karabakh.

In an interview with the Russian news agency RIA Novosti in February 2021, Armenian Foreign Minister Ara Aivazian commended Russia for its successful effort at facilitating the return of Armenian captives, detained by Azerbaijan, to their “homeland.” Nevertheless, Armenia accused Azerbaijan of creating “artificial, groundless obstacles towards the immediate repatriation of Armenian prisoners of war and detained civilians.” He also stated that Armenia adhered to the Trilateral Agreement and was seeking to strengthen ties between Armenia and Russia. [137]

On 7 September 2022, days prior to a short Armenia-Azerbaijan border clash, Pashinyan was attending the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, where Russia was present. Pashinyan used the forum as a means to laud Russian President Vladimir Putin’s personal efforts as the reason behind the November 2020 ceasefire. Additionally, he declared his “hope to settle relations with Turkey with the assistance of Russia.” However, he also expressed his worry that “the Ukrainian issue” (his euphemism for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) could destabilise security in the South Caucasus. Nevertheless, overall Pashinyan sounded confident in his relationship with Russia, dismissing a journalist’s concern that Armenia might fall under Western sanctions for attending this event. He furthermore presented Russia’s close ties to Azerbaijan and Russia being a Co-Chair in the Minsk Group as advantageous to settling the “Nagorno Karabakh problem.” [138]

SEPTEMBER 2022: BORDER CLASH AND ARMENIA’S APPEAL FOR HELP

Pashinyan’s tone changed drastically a few days later. On 13 September an Armenian newspaper reported that Armenia and Azerbaijan had had another brief border clash. This time however, at an emergency meeting of Armenia’s Security Council chaired by Pashinyan, Armenia appealed to Moscow to “put into action” its defence treaty with Armenia. Armenia also requested assistance from the CSTO and the UN Security Council. Just before, Pashinyan had had a phone call with Putin to discuss the incident. Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan had also spoken with his Russian counterpart Lavrov on the phone. [139]

Instead of intervening on Armenia’s behalf however, Russia’s foreign ministry stated that it had brokered a ceasefire agreement, calling “on the sides to refrain from further escalation of the situation, exercise restrain[t] and strictly observe the ceasefire.” [140] Yerevan expressed its disappointment soon afterwards. The head of the Armenian Security Council Grigorian stated that the goal of the appeal was “military and military-political assistance” to drive out Azerbaijani forces from Armenian territory. “Up until now it has not been fulfilled.” In other words, Armenia’s derivative power failed as a strategy for it to obtain its goal.

THE BLOCKADE OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND THE FINAL OFFENSIVE

One of the key aspects of the 2020 Trilateral Agreement had been keeping the Lachin Corridor open, which connected Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, through Russian peacekeepers. This had been Pashinyan’s condition for the withdrawal of the Armenian Armed Forces from Nagorno-Karabakh. [141] The whole purpose of these “peacekeepers”, in Armenia’s view, was to preserve a modicum of security for the local Armenian population by dissuading Azerbaijan from resorting to military means again over Nagorno-Karabakh. This goal did succeed for two years but began to unwind in December 2022.

That month, Azerbaijan began blockading the Lachin Corridor. Armenia predictably accused Azerbaijan of violating the Trilateral Agreement because it went against Azerbaijan’s guarantee of safe movement of people along the Lachin Corridor. [142] In a statement on 23 April 2023, the Armenian Foreign Ministry called on Russia to fulfil its obligation under Provision 6 of the Trilateral Agreement by eliminating the blockade. This call went unheeded.

In September 2023, the blockade had already brought a humanitarian crisis to Nagorno-Karabakh that was on the verge of famine. That month, Azerbaijan launched a quick military operation that took control of the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh. Consequently, the entire population of Nagorno-Karabakh evacuated to Armenia. The local self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh formally dissolved. [143] By this point, Armenia had become disillusioned with its strategy of derivative power based on friendship with Russia. During 22-23 September, instead of calling on Russian obligations, Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan spoke before both the UN Security Council [144] and the UN General Assembly [145] to try to mitigate this disaster for Armenia’s margins for manoeuvre. Which again failed.

Armenia’s current future looks uncertain. Pashinyan’s government in the past couple of years has taken a series of actions aspiring to be aligned with the West. This includes: (1) Armenia consenting to an ongoing fully-fledged EU civil mission that was deployed on its side of the border with Azerbaijan in January 2023 with the expressed goal to increase human security in Armenia and promote confidence building between Armenia and Azerbaijan; [146] (2) Armenia formally becoming a member of the International Criminal Court this February which would make Azerbaijan subject to its jurisdiction if its military ever entered Armenian territory; (3) that same month Armenia froze its membership in the Russian-led CSTO. The CSTO Secretary General Tasmagambetov has emphasized that Armenia has not formally suspended its membership in the organisation. He nonetheless has acknowledged the fact that Yerevan no longer actively participates in the organisation. [147] This September, Armenian authorities announced the exposure of what it alleged to be a Russian-orchestrated attempted coup. [148] These recent events lead me to conclude that, at least as long as Nikol Pashinyan remains Armenia’s prime minister, Armenia will continue the process of shedding its historical relationship with Russia as it shifts ever more towards Western-led institutions.

CONCLUSION

This paper has provided insights into how derivative power can fail in protecting small states national interests through the example of Armenia’s reliance on Russian security failing to prevent Azerbaijan reconquering the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Additionally, it has also contributed to the literature on Armenia’s reliance on Russian security by applying the concept of derivative power to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the 2022 Border Clash and the 2023 Azerbaijani Offensive. Furthermore, it has shown how a state’s use of derivative power can become less reliable over time, as in the case of Armenia during the years 2020-2023.

It has also shown that Armenia tried to leverage its power with Russia through calling Russian officials directly and meeting with them. One such instance was the Trilateral Agreement that included a meeting between Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev, Pashinyan and Putin. This agreement was what Pashinyan subsequently used as justification for requesting Russian military assistance in response to Azerbaijani actions in September and December 2022. Pashinyan had also used the Eastern Economic Forum as an opportunity to emphasise how much Armenia valued Russia as an ally. This further contributes to the literature by showing that the means of derivative power are diverse.

This paper has been focused on Armenia’s relationship with Russia. A related topic barely touched upon in this paper that could be further researched is how Armenia has been gradually replacing its relationship with Russia with Western countries (e.g., France and US) and Western-led international organisations such as the EU, the International Criminal Court and the UN. On a more positive note, the demise of Nagorno-Karabakh has removed the main source of tension between Armenia and international law. This has lessened Armenia’s need to rely on Russia. Perhaps it could even lead to a more secure and prosperous Armenia.